Professor Ju lie Novkov's Constituting Workers, Protecting Women1 examines the so-called Lochner era of American constitutional jurisprudence through the lens of the struggle over the constitutionality of "protective" labor legislation, su ch as maximum hours and minimum wage laws. Many of these laws applied only to women, and Novkov argues that the debate over the constitutionality of protective laws for women -laws that some women's rights advo cates saw as discriminatory legislation against women -ultimately had important implications for the constitutionality of protective labor legislation more generally .
Liberally defined, the Lochner era2 lasted from the Slaughter House Cases in 1873 -in which fou r Supreme Cou rt Justices advo cated strong constitutional protection for occupational liberty3 -through the triumph of the New Deal in the late 1930s. In preparing her book, Novkov apparently unearthed and read every reported fed eral and state case on protective labor legislation du ringthe relevant time period.4 Having tabulated these cases, Novkov finds that both federal and state cou rts were mu ch more likely to uphold women's protective legislation than to uphold general protective labor legisla tion. In fact, decisions affirming the constitutionality of women's pro tective legislation often paved the way for later sex-neutral legislation.
Novkov usefully divides the Lochner era into fo ur distinct periods. As discussed below, Novkov's analysis of these periods is not fu lly per suasive. The four periods she delineates, however, do tr ac k major shifts in Supreme Cour t doctrine regardin g the government's power to regulate labor (and to regulate the economy more generally), and will be used to frame this Review. Part I of this Review discusses Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding protective labor legislation from 1873-1897. Novkov refers to this period as t h e "era of generalized balancing," in which "the tension between liberty an d police power emerged as the central focus of claims gr ounded in due process" (p. 32).
Part II of this Review discusses what Novkov calls the "era of spe cific balancing," which lasted from 1898-1910. According to Novkov, this period saw a significant increase in legislation regulating labor contracts, including legislation that applied on ly to women workers (p. 33). Novkov asserts that courts began to focus on the types of labor legislatures sought to regu late, distinguishing between the pr ototypical male laborer in an "ordinary" occupation on the one hand, an d classes of laborers considered legitimately in need of government assistance on the other. In 1908, in Muller v. Oregon,5 the Supreme Court af firmed the constitutionality of maximum hours laws for women.
In the ensuing period of "laborer-centered analysis" between 1911 an d 1923, discussed in Part III of this Review, courts focused on "the justifications that could be used to show that pr otective labor legisla tion for women was legitimate" (p. 33). During this er a, the Supreme Court was inclin ed to uphold protective legislation . Advocates of pr otective laws for women gr adually shifted their ar gu ment from women's natural disabilities to more general "laborer-centered" ar gu ments that necessitous workers of an y sex were not truly free. The constitutionality of maximum hours laws for male factory workers was established during this period.
Finally, Part IV of this Review discusses the period from 1923 through 1937, which Novkov refers to as an era of "gendered rebal ancing" (p. 34). The focus of eff orts to enact pr otective legislation shifted once again to laws that applied exclusively to wom en , espe cially minimum wage laws. The er a began with the Supreme Court overturning a minimum wage law for women in Adkins v. Children's Hospital,6 on the gr ounds that women have the same right to liberty of contract as men. It ended with the Court upholding a similar law in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.7 In West Coast Hotel, the Court adopted the argument that allowing women workers with unequal bargaining power to negotiate contracts for themselves for less than a living wage cannot be considered liberty at all.
208 U.S. 412 (1908).
6. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
7. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) . [Vol. 101:1960 As discussed in this Review, throughout Constituting Workers, Protecting Women, Novkov provides an in teresting and generally well-researched narrative regarding the debate over the constitutionality an d wisdom of pr otective labor legislation for women. She sometimes shows gr eat scholarly care, rejecting some hoary an d popular myths about the Lochner er a. Novkov notes, for example, that Lochner itself was something of an aberration in its time, one of the very few cases in validating protective labor legislation before the 1920s.
On the other hand, Novkov seems overly enamored with applying the concept of "nodes of conflict" to the controversy over pr otective laws for women. She defines nodes of conflict as "a point at which the pu blic, attorneys, an d the courts ar e all in communication " (p. 20) . This Reviewer did not find the nodes of conflict concept especially enlightening, an d suspec ts that it distracted Novkov from taking a more nuanced approach to the history of the controversy over protective labor laws. In particular , as discussed in Part V of this Review, Novkov ignores relevant economic issues, overemphasizes the role of legal argument in explaining constitutional development, an d overstates the relative importance of the debate over pr otective laws for women to the more general debate over constitutional limits on the government's regu latory power.
I. THE E RA OF G ENERALIZED B ALANCING, 1873-1898
Novkov appropriately begins her study of the constitutional conflict over pr otective labor legislation for women with an analysis of two cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1873 -the Slaughter-House Cases8 an d Bradwell v. lllinois.9 In Slaughter-House, four dissenting Justices vigorously argued that the Fourteenth Amendment's Pr ivileges or Immunities Clause protected the right to earn a living from infringement by government-established monopoly. The right ar ticulated in the Slaughter-House dissents eventually evolved in to the right to pursue an occupation free from unreasonable government in terference enforced by the Lochner Court.
In Bradwell, by contrast, three of the four dissenting Slaughter-House Justices concurred in the Court's ruling that Illinois could prohibit women from practicing law. They reasoned that "[t]he natur al and proper timidity an d delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life .... The paramount destiny an d mission of woman are to fulfill the noble an d benign offices of wife an d mother."10 The contrast between the With regard to protective legislation limited to women workers, most of the litigation during this era involved laws that banned women from serving alcohol.13 Only two of the cases during this er a involved sex-based pr otective laws for women in industry, a category which was soon to be the focal point of a gr eat deal of litigation. In 1876, the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld a maximum hours law for women because the statute "merely provides that in an employment, which the Legislature has evidently deemed to some extent dangerous to health, no person shall be engaged in labor more than ten-hours a day or sixty-hours a week."14
The other sex-based pr otective-law case, Ritchie v. People,15 involved an Illinois law limiting women to an eight-hour work day. Novkov does not discuss the history of this law, but other historians have done so. A br oad coalition of women's reform gr oups had lob bied for the law.16 These gr oups believed that women were unable to compete on equal terms with men in the workplace and therefore needed legislative intervention on their behalf to protect them from overwork. In contrast, almost all of the women workers who appeared 11. Novkov focuses her attention on courts' reliance on liberty of contract under the Due Process Clause. P. 51. For a discussion of the relationship between the equal protection and due process decisions, see David E. Bernstein Vol. 101:1960 at tr ial testified that they preferred to work longer hours to get higher pay. ' 7
When a challenge to the law reac hed the state supreme court in 1895, Illinois argu ed that women 's biologic al differences from men, combined with their unique role in bearing offspring, justified the ex ercise of the state police power on women's behalf.18 In response, Ritchie's attorney contended that women had full citizenship rights an d that the law deprived women of their right to make a living. 1 9 The brief quoted libertarian treatise au thor Christopher Tiedeman for the pr oposition that "the constitutional gu ar an ty of the liberty of contract applies to women, married or single, as well as men . "20
The Illinois Supreme Court sided with Ritc hie. Novkov asserts that Ritchie "did not take much notice of the female workers affec ted by the statute at issue in the case" (p. 61), "ignore [d] gender" (p. 101), an d did not "refer to gender specifically" (p. 124 ). This reading of Ritchie is in explicable. While it's true that the Illinois Supreme Court "saw no need to reason differently about police power simply because the workers involved ... happened to be female" (p. 71), the court did not ignore the sex of the workers regulated by the hours law.
To the contrary, Ritchie contains rousing feminist language, albeit language reflecting a libertarian classical liberal an d in dividualist feminism,21 rather than the "social feminism"22 of the reformers who supported maximum hours laws. While the court acknowledged that the state had the power to pr otect workers who might injure themselves or others, it den ied that the state could create a blanket distinction between male an d female workers: [W] oman is entitled to the same rights, under the constitution, to make contracts with reference to her labor as are secured thereby to men .... The law accords to her, as to every other citizen, the natural right to gain a livelihood by intelligence, honesty, and industry in the arts, the sci ences, the professions, or other vocations. Before the law, her right to a 17. Nancy S. Erickson, Muller v. Oregon Reconsidered: The Origins of a Sex-Based Doctrine of Liberty of Contract, 30 LAB. HIST. 228, 241 (1989) .
18. See Lori Ann Kran, Gendered Law: A Discourse Analysis of Labor Legislation, 1890 Legislation, -1930 Legislation, , at 50-51 (1993 [1898] [1899] [1900] [1901] [1902] [1903] [1904] [1905] [1906] [1907] [1908] [1909] [1910] 1898 was a crucial year for protective labor legislation . In Holden v. Hardy, the Supreme Court upheld a Utah law mandating a maxi mum eight-hour day for underground miners, despite ar guments that the law was class legislation an d infringed upon liberty of contr act.28 Justice Brown, wr iting for a seven-vote majority, found that the stat ute was an "exercise of a reasonable discretion " by the legislature, an d not class legislation.29 The Court also held that the law's infrin gement on liberty of con tract was justified in order to redress inequalities in bargaining power between workers an d their employers. Just when the constitutionality of most protective labor legislation seemed unassailable, in 1905 the Supreme Court dec ided the infamous case of Lochner v. New York.37 In Lochner, the Supreme Court in vali dated a maximum hours law for bakers as a violation of liberty of contract. Novkov properly understands Lochner as a somewhat an omalous case, rather than as a central case from which to begin an an alysis of the period (p. 87). The Lochner opinion essentially ignored the an ti-class legislation arguments made in Lochner's brief,38 an d in stead focu sed on liberty of contract. The C o urt held that the states' police power did not encompass regulations that protected males working in ordinary occupations. Ordinary occupations were those that posed no special health risks to the workers themselves or to the pu blic at large (pp. 108-110) .
In People v. Williams, the New York Court of Appeals, relying on Lochner, invalidated a law that prohibited women from working at night. The court rejected the constitutionality of special regulations for women workers, propounding instead a "radical vision of equality" (p. 101). The court stated, 31. Wenham v. State, 91 N.W. 421 (Neb. 1902 ). 32. Commonwealth v. Beatty, 15 Pa. Super. 5, 8-9 (1900 [A]n adult [woman] is not to be regarded as a ward of the state, or in any other light than the man is regarded, when the question relates to the business pursuit or calling .... She is entitled to enjoy, unmolested, her liberty of person and her freedom to work for whom she pleases, where she pleases, and as long as she pleases .... [S)he is not to be made the special object of the exercise of the paternal power of the state . . .. 39
Meanwhile, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld a ten-hou r day an d sixty-hour week law for women.40 Reformers marshaled their forces to defend this opinion. Aft er Ritchie, local reform organizations had banded together in 1898 (not 1899, as Novkov states) to form the National Consumers' League as an umbrella organization to lobby for the improvement of industrial standards for workers, especially women workers.41 Florence Kelley was soon appointed general secre tary an d became a national force in reformist citcles.42 Her efforts were su pported by the newly formed National Women's Trade Union League, which tried to organize women workers and also lobbied for protective labor legislation (pp. 80-81). These organizations supported protective legislatiOn for women both because they thought women workers were easily exploited43 and a:s a step toward greater legal pro tections for all workers. 44 The reformists knew that the ulti mate outcome of the Oregon case was crucial to their cause. The Consumers' League hired famed attor ney Louis Brandeis to write a Supreme Court· brief defending Oregon 's maximum hours law. Bran deis apparently decided that a frontal attack on Lochner was too ri sky, even though on e member of the five-vote majority in that case, Justice Henry Brown , had retired an d been replaced· by the more liberal Wi lliam Moody.45 In stead, Brandeis resolved to sh ow that women workers were more like the 39. People v. Williams, 81 N.E. 778, 780 (N.Y. 1907 [W]e are interested in the protection of women workers by wage legislation at this time, not particularly because they are women, but because they are underpaid workers and underpayment is a social menace whether the worker be a man or woman, but it happens that the condition pressed most heavily upon women at this time, and it seems to me that we should regard those conditions as unique to women. 45. WOLOCH, supra note 41 , at 28. [Vol. 101:1960 necessitous miners of Holden, in need of state protec tion, than like the sturdy bakers of Lochner.
As Novkov points out, the Lochner Court had found that baking "was not un healthy either in common understandin g, or in scientific fac t" (p. 108; emphasis added). The sc ientific facts were provided to the Court in an appendix to Lochner's br ief, which contained a com pilation of medical, scientific , an d statistic al data.46 Justice Peckham clearly relied on this appendix in wr iting Lochner, as much of his dicta about the relative safety of baking tr ac ks information contained in the appendix, an d he explicitly stated that his opinion was informed by "looking through statistics regarding all trades an d occ upations."47 Brandeis, then, kn ew that his job was to appeal both to "common knowledge" about the health effec ts of long hours on women an d also to pr esen t statistical an d other evidence in support of restricting women's work hours. He pr epared a brief that contained an unusually concise legal ar gument that foc used on distinguishing Lochner. The rest of the brief consisted of hundreds of pages of documents sup porting the view that women's work hours should be limited. The brief attempted to support "four matters of general kn owledge": (1) women ar e physically weaker than men; (2) a woman's ill health could damage her reproductive capacity; (3) damage to a woman's health could affec t the health of her future offspring; an d (4) excess hours of labor for women ar e harmful to family life.48 In short, the br ief "treats all women as mothers or poten tial mothers; it either conflates the needs of families an d society with those of women or pr efers the for mer to the latter; an d it depicts women as weak an d defective."49
The evidence in Brandeis's brief was an ecdotal an d unscientific . It consisted of a "hodgepodge"50 of reports of fac tory or health in spec tors, testimony before legislative in vestigating committees by witnesses such as physicians or social workers, statutes, an d quotes fr om medical text in journals, along with similar sources. Ironically, just about the on ly relevant authority not cited in the br ief were women worker s themselves, whose views were apparently considered superfluous.51 51. The only women workers whose views appeared in the brief were bookbinders and printers studied in the 1870s. WO LOCH, supra note 41 , at 32.
Laundry owner Kurt Muller's brief , by contrast, contained a strongly worded appeal for women's equal ri ght to freedom of contract.52 Muller's brief, relying on the Illinois and New York opin ions invalidating protective laws for women, demonstrated the fact that "argu ments for freedom of contract and sexual equality were natural allies; they were branches of the same tree, individualism,"53 or, more precisely, classical liberalism. On a more pragmatic level, the "specter of protective laws now forced employers and their lawyers to develop an affinity for sexually egalitarian ideals."54
The Supreme Court, however, was not yet ready to treat women as fully equal citizens entitled to the same degree of li berty of contract as men. The Court upheld the law in an opinion by Justice Brewer. Brewer was famously libertarian; his most memorable·opinion stated: "The paternal theory of government is to me odious. The utmost pos sible li berty to the individual, and the fullest possible protection to him and hi s property, is both the li mitation and du ty of government."55 He, along wi th Justice Rufus Peckham, consistently dissented in the Court's decisions upholding general protective legislation.56
Protective laws for women, however, were another matter, and Brewer wrote the opinion upholding the Oregon maximum hours law. Brewer wrote that "woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence," especially "when the burdens of motherhood are upon her."57 Prolonged work hours had "injurious eff ects" on women's bodies and as "healthy mothers are essential to vi gorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of pu blic interest and care in order to preserve the strength ... of the race. "58 While women's legal ri ghts had been extended, "there is that in her di sposi tion and habits of lif e which will operate against a fu ll assertion of those ri ghts. She wi ll still be where some legislation to protect her seems necessary to secure a real equality of ri ght."59 Thus, the maximum hours law did not vi olate the ri ght to li berty of contract. Nor was the law improper class legislation. "Woman," Brewer wrote, is "properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her 52. Pp. 97-98. Muller's brief also claimed that laundry work was not especially unhealthful, and therefore the hours law was unconstitutional under Lochner. P. 120. [Vol. 101:1960 protection may be su stained, even when like legislation is not necessary for men an d could not be sustained."60 Brandeis typic ally gets credit, including fr om Novkov (p. 128), for persu ading the Court to uphold the hours law because of the data contained in his brief. In deed, the so-called "Brandeis Brief" -heavy on sociological data an d light on legal ar gu ment -became a staple of constitutional ar gu ment over Pr ogressive refor ms. The importance of Brandeis' s brief in Muller, however , has been exaggerated. While Brewer, who certainly had no sympathy for Br andeis's progressivism, made the unusual gesture of ac knowledging Brandeis's brief in a footnote,61 Brewer stated that the brief simply provided evidence of the "widespread belief" that long hours of labor were harmful to women an d their pr ogeny.62 Because under Holden and Lochner either common knowledge or scientific evidence was suffic ient to justify a regu lation that was defen ded as a health law within the police power , Brandeis's brief was largely su perfluous.63
Women refor mers were elated with their victory (p. 112). They ar gued that pr otective measures would ac tually "enhance women's liberty by en abling women to make fairer bargains with their employ er s" (p. 96). Even the sexism in the opin ion reflected a "matern alist" ideology that was widely acc epted among the Progr essive ac tivists of the National Con sumers' League an d the National Women's Trade Un ion League.64 To the extent they were troubled by some of the implications of the opinion for women's rights, leaders of both gr oups "seemed to agree that abstract commitments to liberty were secondar y to the concrete task of ensurin g better conditions for women's labor " (p. 96). 1217, 1218 (1996) ("If the Court meant what it said, the statute in Muller would have been upheld even without Brandeis's voluminous statistical effort .... "). Dailey, however, errs when she argues that "the Muller opinion actually defied the reformist Progressive agenda by promoting an ab stract ideal of the virtuous mother." Id. at 1217. The maternalist ideal was in fact promoted by Progressive reformers, see infra note 64 and accompanying text, and Brandeis's brief cer tainly emphasized the threat to women's maternal obligations posed by industrial labor. Indeed, one feminist author blamed Brandeis for introducing into the legal debate "the po tential-mothers-of-the-race argument, an argument which, from the inevitability of its popular appeal and its imperviousness to embarrassment on grounds of scientific inaccuracy, was nothing less than a stroke of genius." Blanche Crozier, Note, Constitutional LawRegulation of Conditions of Employment of Women. A Critique of Muller v. Oregon, 13 B.U. L. REV. 276, 278 (1933 Moreover, Kelley an d other reformist leaders believed that protec tive laws for women would eventu ally lead to protective laws for all workers, as had occurred in England.65 An d if some women workers were in the meantime harmed by protective legislation -after the Supreme Court ruled against Kurt Mu ller, he apparently fired all his women employees an d replaced them with male Chinese, and later with deaf mutes66 -that was a small price to pay to advance progres sive policies.67 Indeed, some reformers saw women workers as an obstacle to their goal of persuading society that employers should be required to pay male heads of households a wage su fficient to support their families, known in labor-union circ les as the "family wage" (p. 96). The National Consumers' League opposed pu blicly fu nded daycare, healthcare for working mothers, an d an y other reform that might tempt women to en ter the workforce.68
Novkov, like other writers, suggests that dissension among femi nists over the issue of protective legislation for women did not begin in earnest until the mid-1910s (p. 133). As early as 1906, however, a female economist wrote in the Journal of Political Economy that "no on e should lose sight of the fac t that [protective] legislation is not en ac ted exclusively, or even primarily, for the benefit of women themselves."69 Two years later, Muller attracted criticism from some feminists. For example, Louisa Harding, writing in The Woman's Standard, the offic ial organ of the Iowa Suffrage Association, found Muller to be an "abominable" decision .70 Restricting women's work hours, she argued, "practically amounts to confiscation of whatever amount would have been earned during the forbidden hours. "71 1905-1925, at 165 (1987) (explaining that this attitude was denounced by women opponents of protective legislation); cf ELIZABETH FAULKNER BAKER, PROTECTIVE LABOR LEGISLATION 437 (1925) (noting that advocates of protective laws for women believed that "that the few women who suffer from special protective laws should surrender their individ ual interests for the benefit of larger groups of women"); SANDRA F. V ANBURKLEO, "BELONGING TO THE WORLD": WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE 217-18 (2001) ("reformers thought that the social advantages of state intervention outweighed losses of freedom, and they knew full well that women paid a steep price for a measure of security"). , 1911-1923 Muller fir mly established the constitutionality of women-only hours regulation. Over the next seven years, the Supreme Court issued several more rulings upholding maximum hours laws for women, inc luding laws that limited women to an eight-hour day.72 Meanwhile, state courts acquiesced to Muller (p. 140), including cour ts that had pr eviously advanced strong libertarian ar guments against protective laws for women . The Illinois Supr eme Court reversed Ritchie an d upheld a new maximum hours law.73 The court reasoned that "woman 's physical structur e and the performance of maternal func tions place her at a gr eat disadvantage in the battle of life," an d there for e pr otective legislation was within the police power .74 The New Yor k Court of Appeals, meanwhile, which had pr eviously in validated an hours law for women in Williams, justified a ban on nighttime work for women based on "the pec uliar functions which have been imposed on [women] by nature."75 Cases involving protective legislation for women were now established "as a separate category within due pr oc ess" (p. 138).
ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS

III. THE E RA OF L ABORER-C ENTERED A NALYSIS
Opin ions upholding protective laws for women foc used "on women's biological differ enc es fr om men an d these physical differ ences' impact on women's health" (p. 139). Many feminist refor mers would have pr eferred the courts to in stead rely on the per ceived need for protection of women workers due to women 's inferior socioeconomic position , an d the need for government interven tion on behalf of workers more generally (p. 139). Such socioeconomic argu ments soon bec ame more promin en t. The National Consumers' League filed a brief supporting a minimum wage law for women in Stettler v. O'Hara.76 The brief, authored by Brandeis, Goldmark, an d but to prevent them from being "enabled in some measure to enjoy the pleasure of an inde pendent life''); Against Justice Brewer's Decision, WOMAN'S TRIB., May 9, 1908, at 19 (re porting that the Women's Henry George League of New York had vociferously denounced Muller); Special Legislation for Women, WOMAN'S TRJB., Feb. 29, 1908 , at 16 ("The princi ple of sex legislation is absolutely wrong and unjust, and no superstructure of justice can be built upon it.").
None of these early critiques by women of protective legislation appear in the bibliogra phy of Constituting Worker�� Protecting Women. Felix Frankfurter, claimed that the law should be upheld because women were unable to negotiate eff ectively with their employers for a variety of biological an d socioeconomic reasons (pp. . The brief also made a nongendered argumen t in favor of minimum wage laws, arguing that "[w]hen no limit exists below which wages may not fall, the laborer's freedom is in effect totally destroyed."77 Thus, true liberty was not liberty of contract, but the right to a decent wage.78
Although Novkov gives the Stettler brief a lot of attention , it may not have been especially influential. Chief Justice (and Lochner dis senter) Edward D. White, clearly un impressed with the brief, sardoni cally remarked that he "could compile a brief twice as thick to prove that the legal profession ought to be abolished."79 In an y event, the Stettler Court upheld the law in a four-four per curiam ruling with no opinion . Bran deis, who had just joined the Court, recused himself. Be cause he was a clear fifth vote in favor of upholding the law, the con stitutionality of minimum wage laws for women seemed established, an d such laws spread to states around the coun try.
Beyon d Stettler, 1917 was a banner year for supporters of protec tive labor legislation. The Supreme Court upheld a maximum hours law for railroad workers that seemed to guarantee them an increase in hourly pay;80 three workmen's compensation . laws;81 and a maximum hours law for all (male an d female) in dustrial workers.82 The latter case, Bunting v. Oregon,83 seemed to vindicate the National Consumers' League's strategy of using maximum hours laws for women as a wedge to expand the sc ope of these laws to inc lude all workers. Justice Mc Kenna wrote for the Court, "It is now demonstra ble that the considerations that were patent as to miners in 1898 are today operative, to a greater or less degree, throughout the in dustrial system."84 Holden, an d not Lochner, had apparently carried the day.
Meanwhile, latent feminist opposition to sex-based protective laws was gainin g institutional support. The Women's League for Equal 77. P. 145 (quoting Brief for Defendants in Error upon Reargument at 330, Stettler, 243 U.S. at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
78. P. 168. One should note, however, as Novkov does not, that the brief also made Muller-type arguments to the Court. For example, the brief asserted the "mother of the race" argument, contending that "[t]he health of the race is conditioned upon preserving the health of women, the future mothers of the republic." Michigan LawReview [Vol. 101:1960 Opportunity was founded in 1915 by women enraged at the displacement of thousands of women workers by New York's pr ohibi tion of night work by women.85 Women printer s, restaur ant employ ees, an d streetcar wor kers had been particularly hard hit.86 Two years later, an other gr oup of women founded the Equal Rights Association to educate the general public about the negative effects of pr otective laws for women .87 The National Federation of Business an d Pr ofessional Women also opposed sex-based protective laws.88
ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT
The most important opponent of protective laws for women was the National Women's Party ("NWP") (p. 133). Formerly a radical suffragist gr oup, the NWP dissolved af ter passage of the Nineteenth Amendmen t an d reconstituted for the purpose of lobbying for passage of an Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA") that would guarantee women full legal equality (p. 186). Pr ogressive reformers, both within an d without the NWP, urged the NWP to agree to except protective laws from the ER A.89 After some hesitation, the NWP, under the leadership of Alice Paul, refused.90 Paul an d other NWP leaders believed that protective laws pr evented women from entering male-dominated professions an d set a dangerous pr ec edent for other sex-based legislation . , 1921-1929 (2002) , and CHRISTINE A. LUNARDINI, FROM EQUAL SUFFRAGE TO EQUAL RIGHTS: ALICE PAUL AND THE NATIONAL WOMAN 'S PARTY, 1910 'S PARTY, -1928 'S PARTY, (1986 (pp. 187, 198) , a position the NWP officially adopted during the Great Depression (p. 199). Nevertheless, the NWP's opposition to sex-based protective laws led to criticism that they de facto supported laissez-faire policies and were tools of big business.94 NWP leaders retorted that the American Federation of Labor ("AFL") -which in the 1910s began to endorse and lobby for protective labor legislation that applied only to women, while oppos ing such legislation for men95 -supported sex-based protective legis lation to keep women from competing for men's jobs.96
IV. THE E RA OF G ENDERED R EBALANCING, 1923-1937
The "era of gendered rebalancing" began with the case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital, involving the constitutionality of a federal law establishing a minimum wage for women workers in the District of Columbia.97 The drafters of the law went ou t of their way to try to en su re that the law could not be deemed "arbitrary " -and therefore a violation of due process -by calibrating the required compensation with results of studies showing the wage a woman needed to earn to be able to afford necessities.
The D.C. Court of Appeals nevertheless declared the law unconsti tu tional as a violation of liberty of contract and women's rights. The District of Columbia hired Felix Frankfurter to defend the law before the Supreme Court. Frankfurter filed a "Brandeis Brief" containing members of this group used arguments that "coincided with ... old-line notions of laissez faire capitalism"). The League, unlike the NWP, opposed gender-neutral protective laws.
Suzanne La Follette, a disciple of Albert Jay Nock, was a prominent feminist-libertarian opponent of protective Jaws for women and for everyone else, though, like Nock, she fa vored the rather odd economic theories of Henry George. See SUZANNE LA FOLLETTE, CONCERNING WOMEN 175-84 (1926) (discussing her opposition to protective legislation for male or female workers). For a brief biography, see Sharon Presley, Susanne La Follette: The Freewoman (1999), at http://www.alf.org/papers/LaFollette.html. WOMEN 201 (1980) ; Cott, supra note 89, at 62. 95. Pp. 96, 152 n.4; HART, supra note 43, at 78; KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 68, at 69. Minimum wage legislation for women only passed where organized labor was supportive. HART, supra note 43, at 69, 83. A contemporary source states that by the early 1930s, the AFL was the most important supporter of protective labor legislation, and played that role to protect the jobs of its male members from women. Crozier, supra note 63, at 287-88. Crozier's note is one of several important sources that surprisingly do not appear in Novkov's bibliography.
MEREDITH TAX, THE RISING OF THE
96. Cott, supra note 89, at 61. This accusation had some merit. See, e. g. , KESSLER HARRIS, supra note 86, at 201-05 (describ. ing labor unions' support of various "protective" measures for women because the unions knew the laws would lead to women's exclusion from their industries); LEHRER, supra note 67, at 159 (noting that the Iron Molders' Union used concerns about women's health to encourage the government to eliminate them from high-paying jobs); Jane Norman Smith, Hours Legislation for Women Only, EQUAL RTS., Jan. 16, 1932, at 396, 396 (noting that some labor leaders explicitly supported "protective" laws for women so that men could take their jobs).
97. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). (Vol. 101:1960 over one thousand pages of documentation supporting the law. Unlike Brandeis's brief in Muller, however, Frankfurter also spent substantial energy on legal argument. Also in contrast to the original Brandeis Brief, Frankfurter did not focus on women's purported or assumed disabilities, but instead "emphasiz[ed] the fictitious nature of freedom of contract when the employee was bargaining for a wage that did not meet her cost of living."98 He spent only a page rebutting the lower court's suggestion that the law unconstitutionally discriminated against women. The brief relied on Muller for the proposition that the legisla ture could take differences between men and women into account. The opposing brief, meanwhile, made a strong women's rights argu ment, relying on information supplied by the NWP.99
In a surprise to most legal observers, who had believed that Lochner was defunct after Bunting,'00 the Court revived Lochner101 and invalidated the minimum wage law. The Court suggested that the law unconstitutionally infringed on liberty of contract in a variety of ways, especially by placing an arbitrary , unfair burden on employers to support employees lacking the skills to earn a better wage.102 The Court also denounced the law as illicit class legislation disfavoring women. The Court, in dramatic language, adopted the position that women were, after passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, fully equal 98. Pp. 200-01 . Other advocates of protective laws, however, continued to rely on "fundamental" "physical and biological differences between men and women" as a rationale for protective laws. E. g. , Frances Perkins, Do Women in Industry Need Special Protection? Yes, SURV. 529, 530 (1926 ("[Adkins] suggests that the majority of the Court is disposed to return to the attitude of the Court in the Lochner case and to emphasize the individual's right to freedom from restraint, rather than the public welfare which justifies legislative restriction of that free dom."(emphasis omitted)); Samuel A. Goldberg, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Minimum Wage Laws, 71 U. PA. L. REV. 360, 365 (1923) c1t1zens, which in turn created a presumption that laws subj ecting women to special disabilities or allowing special privileges are uncon stitutional. While the physical differences between men and women could justify certain types of sex-based protective labor legislation, the Court could not "accept the doctrine that women of mature age, sui juris, require or may be subjected to restrictions upon their liberty of contract which could not lawfu lly be imposed in the case of men under similar circumstances. "103 Novkov notes the strong equal rights language in this opinion (p. 226), but thinks it ironic that "because women now had the ability to vote, they could no longer be protected through the legislative proc ess .... [T]heir political equality with men had rendered them subject to the same deprivations" (p. 226). Novkov fails to note that one of the plaintiffs in Adkins losf her job due to the minimum wage law,104 or that minimum wage laws often price their "beneficiaries" out of the labor market by raising marginal wage rates above marginal produc tivity.
Novkov apparently finds Adkins's women's rights argument a ploy -at best superfluous and at worst disingenuous -to cover the Court's support of reactionary economic policies.105 After all, the Court continued to uphold laws regulating women's work hours, so the principle of equality was not consistently applied.106 Yet Adkins's au thor, Justice George Sutherland, had been a leading Senate sup porter of the Nineteenth Amendment107 and an adviser to the NWP during the ratification battle. He also advised the NWP regarding the drafting of the Equal Rights Amendment.108 103. Id. at 553. Daniel Ernst suggests that the Nineteenth Amendment was significant to Sutherland less because it demonstrated public acceptance of women's equality, and more because the fact that women could vote opened the possibility that politicians would seek to win their votes by promising them special favorable legislation, an idea that raised concerns that purportedly protective laws would actually amount to illicit class legislation. Daniel R. Ernst, Homework and the Police Power from Jacobs to Adkins, 39 LAB. HIST. 417, 420-22 (1998 114, 127 (1996) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital made a farce of women's equality.").
106. Just one year after Adkins, the Court, in an opinion also written by Sutherland, upheld a law banning night work for women because common knowledge suggested that women have weaker constitutions than men do. Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. To my own mind the right of women to vote is as obvious as my own .... Women on the av erage are as intelligent as men, as patriotic as men, as anxious for good government as men .... [T] o deprive them of the right to participate in the government is to make an arbi trary division of the citizenship of the country upon the sole ground that one class is made up of men, and should therefore rule. and the other class is made of women, who should, there fore, be ruled.
[Vol. 101:1960 Novkov provides no indication that she is aware of Sutherland's sincere support for women's rights. In this regard, she is hardly alone among feminist historians who have written about the controversy over protective laws for women. Joan Zimmerman, for example, su ggests that Sutherland's support for women's rights in Adkins was insincere, but she provides no evidence beyond an apparent su spicion that no one with "conservative" economic views could be a true ally of women's rights.109 As for Sutherland's (and the Court's) acquiescence to restrictions on women's work hours, Muller had established the constitutionality of such restrictions by unanimous vote only fifteen years earlier, and it would have been quite remarkable for the Court to reverse that decision.
As the Great Depression approached, the Supreme Court invali dated two more minimum wage laws,110 and the unconstitutionality of minimum wage legislation seemed settled. In 1935, the Supreme Cou rt invalidated as beyond federal power the National Industrial Recovery Act, which set industrial wage codes in an attempt to raise wages and stem deflationary pressu res.111 Attention shifted to the constitutionality of state minimum wage laws, all of which applied to women only. During the Depression, some states began enforcing 108. Reva B. Siegel, Siz e the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federal ism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 1014 (2002) .
Felix Frankfurter attacked Sutherland's opinion as a "triumph for the Alice Paul theory of constitutional law, which is to no little extent a reflex of the thoughtless, unconsidered assumption that in industry it makes no difference whether you are a man or woman." BAKER, supra note 67, at 98. Other critiques also lambasted the Court's assertion of women's equality. See Goldberg, supra note 101, at 363 ("[Tjhe comfort which the court gets from the Nineteenth Amendment is unwarranted. The amendment gives women political rights, but does not for that reason render them practically and economically equal to men."); Barbara N. Grimes, Comment, Minimum Wage for Women, 11 CAL. L. REV. 353, 357 (1923) :
Will the learned justices of the majority be pardoned for overlooking the cardinal fact that minimum wage legislation is not and never was predicated upon political, contractual or civil inequalities of women? It is predicated rather upon evils to society, resulting from the ex ploitation of women in industry, who as a class labor under a tremendous economic handicap.
By contrast, a defender of the decision wrote that "I feel that it is distinctly harmful to the best interests of women to limit their opportunities for employment and advancement by artificial distinctions between them and men." Charles Cheney, Protect Individual Liberty, 50 SURV. 220 (1923) . minimum wage laws that had been dormant since Adkins, while other states passed new legislation.112
A combination of economic hardship and several relatively liberal Hoover appointments to the Supreme Court (Cardozo, Hughes, and Roberts) suggested that the issue was ripe for reconsideration. The Hoover appointees were critical to the result in Nebbia v. New York,1 13 a 1934 case upholding a law regulating the price of bread, in which the Cou rt by a five-four margin seemed to abandon core Lochnerian premises. In particular, the Court abandoned the notion that govern ment cou ld only regulate prices charged by "businesses affected with a pu blic interest." Because the Adkins Court had analogized the gov ernment's power over the price of labor to its power over the price of goods, Nebbia seemed to advocates of minimum wage laws like a promising precedent.
Nevertheless, in 1936 the Court struck down New York's minimum wage law.114 Hoover appointee Justice Owen Roberts joined the conservative "Four Horsemen" in the five-four decision. The fol lowing year, however, Roberts switched sides, and the Court issued a broad opinion, au thored by Chief Ju stice Charles Evan Hughes, upholding a minimum wage law for women.115 The Court's primary ar gu ment did not directly negate the Court's protection of liberty of con tract. Instead, the Court narrowed liberty of contract's scope and sig naled its acquiescence to protective laws for both men and women.116 The Court argued that liberty of contract was merely a subset of liberty and could be abrogated in the public interest, as other Supreme Court precedents during the Lochner era had shown. Given economic conditions during the Depression, the Court could not say it was unreasonable for a state legislature to try to gu arantee women workers in general a living wage, even if the statutory means chosen harmed workers who cou ld not command the minimum.117
112. See generally Jane Norman Smith, Wage Laws Result in Unemployment, SURV., Feb. 4, 1933, [ Vol. 101:1960 Hughes, echoing a portion of Frankfurter's brief in Adkins,118 also asserted that when an employer pays less than a living wage to a worker in an unequal bargaining position, the employer is implicitly relying on subsidies from taxpayers, i.e., relief payments, to sustain the worker. "The community ," Hughes wrote, "is not bound to provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers."119 Liberty , according to Hughes, can neither be defined as the right of a necessi tous worker to make a contract for less than a living wage, nor as the right of the employer to loot the public fisc by relying on tax money to subsidize inadequate wages.
Progressives were elated with their victory in West Coast Hotel, bu t in retrospect the decision was a step backwards for women's rights. The West Coast Hotel Court adopted a Muller-like patriarchical view of women's place in society , even qu oting Muller for the proposition that "though limitations upon personal and contractual rights may be removed by legislation, there is that in [women's] disposition and hab its of life which will operate against a fu ll assertion of those rights."120 The sexist language in the West Coast Hotel opinion was unnecessary , because it seems clear that the majority 's reasoning could have sup ported sex-neutral minimum wage laws as well. As Novkov notes, " [t] he initial focus on women as particularly vu lnerable workers had enabled the logical extension of the argument that the state cou ld intervene in any relationship of employment" once the legal system "acknowledged inequalities in bargaining power as potentially burdensome for the state" (p. 224). Although superfluous, the Court's holding that "class legislation" could be used to "protect" women was S. 379 (1937) . Because this argument was not briefed in West Coast Hotel, its presence in the opinion leads to the inter esting question of whether this idea was simply "in the air" or whether Hughes was some how influenced by Frankfurter.
119. W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 399-400. 120. Id. at 394-95 (quoting Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908) ). By contrast, Sutherland wrote in dissent:
The common law rules restricting the power of women to make contracts have, under our system, long since practically disappeared. Women today stand upon a legal and political equality with men. There is no longer any reason why they should be put in different classes in respect of their legal right to make contracts; nor should they be denied, in effect, the right to compete with men for work paying lower wages which men may be willing to accept. And it is an arbitrary exercise of the legislative power to do so.
Id. at 411-12 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). He added that " [t] he ability to make a fair bargain, as everyone knows, does not depend on sex. Id Instead, within the next several years, the Court was taken over by a wave of Roosevelt appointees, all of whom were chosen because they could be relied upon to uphold economic regulations under almost any circumstances.124 As early as 1938, the Court famously announced its view that economic regulations did not impinge on fundamental rights, and that only laws threatening civil liberties and 121. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a law prohibiting a woman from being licensed as a bartender unless she was the wife or daughter of the male owner of a licensed liquor establishment). 533, 587 (1939) (Roberts, J., dissenting):
As the order is drawn and administered it inevitably tends to destroy the business of smaller handlers by placing them at the mercy of their larger competitors. I think no such arrangement was contemplated by the Act, but that, if it was, it operates to deny the appellees due process of law.
See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 218-25 (2000) (arguing that Hughes never completely abandoned "guardian review" of economic regula tions).
123. Despite his dissent in Lochner, Harlan was a "Lochnerian" in the sense that he believed that liberty of contract was a fundamental right that should be protected from arbi trary government regulations. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (Harlan, J.) (invalidating a federal law prohibiting the enforcement of "yellow dog" contracts). He was moderate in the sense that he generally, but not always, deferred to state claims that particular regulations were not arbitrary because they were within the state's police power.
124. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 120, at 220 (discussing Roosevelt's choice of "faithful lieutenants" to fill the many vacancies that occurred between 1937 and 1941 ) . [Vol. 101 :1960 civil rights would receive anything more than the most limited scrutiny.125 Contrary to Novkov's claims, there is little doubt that had the debate over protective legislation for women never occurred, the Roosevelt Court would still have upheld the FL SA and other New Deal labor legislation with no hesitation, just as it overturned 150 years of Commerce Clause jurisprudence in cases such as Wickard v. Filbum.126
V. F URTHER A NALYSIS
Constituting Workers, Protecting Women has some important strengths. Novkov deserves praise for considering such a wide range of Lochner era cases and for reading many of the related legal briefs, an often overlooked but extremely important source for constitutional history . Novkov also provides some compelling analysis. For example, she is one of the few scholars to recognize that Holden v. Hardy, and not Lochner v. New York, was the leading case on the constitutionality of protective labor legislation for much of the so-called Lochner era. The book is also very good at its primary task -explaining how con siderations of sex affected legal arguments regarding protective laws for workers during the period studied.
On the other hand, several flaws make Constituting Workers, Protecting Women less valuable than it might have been. First, Novkov pays almost no attention to any form of economics. Admittedly , this is an endemic problem among nonquantitative social scientists in gen eral, and historians of labor especially , so it is hard to blame Novkov for merely meeting the professional norm.127
Nevertheless, just a little economic analysis could have added a great deal to the book. For example, Novkov never seriously considers whether economic logic suggests that maximum hours laws or minimum wage laws that applied only to female workers actually aided them. Novkov acknowledges that some women's rights advocates argued that applying minimum wage laws to women only benefited male competitors by limiting women workers' ability to compete with men. But Novkov never considers an even more basic case against special minimum wage laws -that in a free labor market, workers are paid a wage close to their marginal productivity.1 28 Employers faced with a minimum wage law will necessarily dismiss their employees who are covered by that law if the mandated wage exceeds long-term marginal productivity.
Novkov seems to accept uncritically the position of Lochner era Progressives that women industrial workers had special disadvantages in the labor market .:__ primarily , that most of them were young, single women who quit once they got married -that made them unusually dependent on their employers. Moreover, reformers of the Lochner era, and even some skeptics of the reformers' legislative goals,129 were convinced that workers' wages and working conditions only improved because of pressure from labor unions, and not because of productiv ity increases. The fact that few women joined or were welcome in labor unions therefore suggested to reformers that women were particularly vu lnerable to exploitationY0 Under such circumstances, in the absence of wage legislation protecting them, it was thought that women workers would accept any wage short of starvation, even when their productivity would have justified a much higher wage.
Yet modern economic theory su ggests, and economic studies show, there is no correlation between overall wage levels and unionization. Rather, wage growth tracks productivity .131 Novkov, meanwhile, pres ents no evidence that women workers during the Lochner era were paid significantly less than their marginal productivity . In short, Novkov does not seriously address the economic consequences of "protective" legislation from the perspective of either economic theory or economic history .
Novkov also fails to discuss the empirical evidence regarding the effect of sex-specific protective labor laws on women workers. short tenure and from reaction against the statism of World War I, but Novkov never mentions these factors. Indeed, and remarkably for a book (by a political scientist!) about constitutional law that culminates in the New Deal era, Franklin Roosevelt's name does not appear in the index.
Novkov even ignores FDR's 1937 court-packing plan, which some historians believe was critical to breaking up the Court's anti-regulatory majority.135 Nor is the reader ever made aware of the existence of Justice Owen Roberts, whose vote in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish swung the Court from a five-four majority against minimum wage laws to a five-four vote in favor of upholding them. A reader of Constituting Workers, Protecting Women could reasonably assume that Novkov thinks that such crucial people and events were mostly irrelevant.
A third problem with Constituting Workers, Protecting Women is that Novkov -perhaps getting a bit carried away with her research project -overstates the importance of the debate over protective laws for women in the general debate over the constitutionality of po lice power legislation more generally. The exaggerated import she attributes to West Coast Hotel has already been noted. To take an other example, Novkov states that "the bulk of the discussion" in courts about due process jurisprudence between 1923 and 1937 "cen tered around minimum wages for women" and "the public focused at tention on these cases" (p. 185). It's true that the controversy over minimum wage laws for women never petered out completely, and that the minimum wage issue was at the forefront of public debate in 1936 and 1937. Nevertheless, it is a gross exaggeration to assert that the public and judicial discussion regarding due process jurisprudence "centered" on sex-based minimum wage laws for the whole 1923-1937 period. During this time, the Court decided many other extremely important and controversial cases under the Due Process Clause. The Court, for example, determined the constitutionality of such controversial and economically significant regulations as residential zoning, 136 the Transportation Act of 1920,137 the Railway Labor Act,138 and manda tory resolution of industrial disputes through government-imposed (Vol. 101:1960 arbitration.139 The Court also expanded its due process jurisprudence to non-economic areas, holding in Meyer v. Nebraska140 that the Due Process Clause protects the rights "to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, [and] to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience,"141 along with other "privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."142 Meyer, in tum, became the basis for other controversial decisions protecting civil liberties. 143 Constituting Workers, Protecting Women would have benefited from a more attention to such context, and more perspective in gen eral. The debate over protective legislation for women played a very important and interesting role in American constitutional, labor, and women's history. Its significance does not need to be embellished to justify the attention Novkov pays to it.
CONCLUSION
Despite the reservations noted above, and the fact that the book would have benefited from a good editor, Constituting Workers, Protecting Women is recommended for readers interested in constitu tional and women's history. While it does not deliver everything the author promises, or that this reviewer would have liked to have seen, it is a cogent account of an important legal and historical controversy. The definitive book on protective labor legislation and women during the Lochner era, however, remains to be written.144
